



The past few months have seen some interesting developments involving civil
society and what’s euphemistically called “court reform” in the United States.
The prestigious American Academy of Arts & Sciences published a wide-ranging
report on “reinventing American democracy for the 21st Century.”1)Tushnet is a
member of the Academy but wasn’t involved in developing the report. Among its
many recommendations was one urging that Congress adopt a statute limiting
U.S. Supreme Court justices to a single 18-year term. On June 30 three NGOs
co-sponsored a virtual rally headlined by Senator Elizabeth Warren advocating
for “court reform.” One of the NGOs favors term limits for Supreme Court justices,
another expanding the Court (“court-packing”).
These developments should interest the international community of scholars
of comparative constitutional law. Not that the reforms are likely to be adopted
in the short run. They could occur only if Democrats achieved the “trifecta” in
November’s elections of winning the Presidency, retaining control of the House
of Representatives, and gaining a majority in the Senate. And, even if that were
to occur, many Democrats, enamored of the Supreme Court because of their
recollection of what it did to promote democracy during the Warren Court era, are at
best uneasy about tinkering with the Supreme Court to achieve what they fear might
be only short-term benefits, and quite a few are actively opposed to doing so.
Seeing Brown v. Board of Education (invalidating racial segregation of public
schools), Roe v. Wade (protecting a woman’s right to choose with respect to
abortion), and Obergefell v. Hodges (the marriage equality decision) as examples
– historical and recent – of Supreme Court decisions protecting fundamental rights,
these groups fear that packing the Court will further strengthen the view, already
common, that the Court is “merely” another political actor. That in turn would make it
more difficult for the Court to serve as what they believe to be an impartial defender
of constitutional rights.
Advocates of court reform know that major court-reform projects have little prospect
of success of course, but they also have in mind the possibility – confirmed by
empirical studies by political scientist Tom Clark – that the mere existence of serious
proposals to change the Court appears to induce moderating behavior by some
justices. (That’s why they might not be discouraged by signals from recent decisions
that the Court might not be quite as conservative as many thought it could be; they
see the Court’s actions as responses to their advocacy rather than as indicating the
absence of any need to pressure the Court.)
The new “court reform” movement is interesting no matter what its actual prospects
are because it seems – but we think only seems – to fall within a broad category of
- 1 -
challenges to constitutional courts brought by populists around the world. And, in
many contexts, these populist challenges are rightly understood to be assaults upon
judicial independence.
The most well-known recent example, of course, is Poland. After winning
a parliamentary majority in 2015, the new Law and Justice (PiS: Prawo i
Sprawiedliwo##) populist government in Poland quickly identified the Constitutional
Tribunal as a main “obstacle” to its plans. Jaros#av Kaczy#ski, the party’s leader,
observed that “the reforms of the constitutional court were needed to ensure there
are no legal blocks on government policies aimed at creating a fairer economy.” The
government managed to render the constitutional court toothless by manipulating
ordinary procedures to pack it with loyalists, which after one year resulted in gaining
a majority over the Tribunal. As Wojciech Sadurski shows in his study of this
transformation, the PiS appointed judges “effectively paralysed the CT, rendering it
unstable to subject new laws to effective constitutional scrutiny.” 
Court-packing was not the only process that PiS used to render the Tribunal
subservient to its political will. A second strategy involved a series of legislative
proposals clearly aiming at curtailing the Tribunal’s independence. In one year,
from 2015 to 2016, the PiS-controlled Parliament adopted six new statutes on the
Constitutional Tribunal, transforming it into “a positive aide” to the government. We
have recounted only a small part of the complex and on-going story about court
“reforms” in Poland motivated by hostility to prior judicial rulings and concerns about
potential future ones. Even this snippet shows that the Polish story is one about a
true assault on judicial independence, badly motivated and covered with at best a fig
leaf of legality, if that.
The U.S. court-reform movement is different from the Polish one. It is not in any
significant way anti-constitutional or illiberal. Proponents of court reform argue
that the U.S. Supreme Court has adopted constitutional interpretations that are
deeply wrong and has done so because its members are the products of a particular
brand of constitutional interpretation associated with what they regard as extreme
conservatives. As they see it, the Court has lost its way, and the best means of
getting back on the path of real U.S.-style constitutionalism is court reform.
Of course some populists who seek to alter the composition of their domestic
constitutional courts say pretty much what the U.S. advocates do. They too say that
their courts have lost their way, have adopted interpretations of their constitutions
that are inconsistent with the nation’s fundamental values, and stand in the way of
adopting needed reforms. 
In a forthcoming article, which we hope to convert into a book, we argue that
addressing these kinds of claims is analytically tricky. We argue that it is mistaken to
criticize such claims as necessarily anti-constitutional or assaults on a fundamental
principle of judicial independence. Sometimes they are, as in Poland and Hungary,
and sometimes they are not, as (we believe) in the United States. 
Instead of discussing “court reform” at the relatively abstract level of “pure”
constitutional design for independent courts, scholars should focus on the specific
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political contexts within which advocacy for court reform occurs, and the specific
political agendas of those seeking court reform. That is, claims about courts having
lost their way and the like have to be evaluated on their merits, substantively with
reference to each nation, its own constitution, and its constitutional traditions.
These constitutions and traditions, some old, some relatively new, are including
commitments to democratic self-governance. And that means that we can’t rule out
in principle the possibility that constitutional courts have indeed unjustifiably limited
the ability of elected governments to advance the policy platforms on which they ran.
In Duncan Kennedy’s words: “When I agree with a frustrated majority, and when the
consequences of the exercise of judicial review are plausibly very dire, and when the
specific court packing plan is sufficiently careful to avoid collateral harm, then I am in
favor of a dramatic intervention … to ‘save the republic.’”  
There’s a great deal embedded in our formulation and Kennedy’s, of course:
For example, what are we to say when constitutional courts stand in the way of
implementing policies that were not part of the winning party’s electoral platform?
For present purposes we need not address such complexities, because our point is
simpler. Conducting the discussion on the level of abstractions about constitutional
design – “judicial independence” and the like – obscures the real stakes, which are
about the substance of the court-reformers’ other policies.
That is true about many discussions of populism” as such. They seek to avoid
discussing openly what are really political disagreements with the populists’
programs. From both a scholarly and a political point of view, that is a mistake.
Put it this way: If Poland’s PiS is an extreme right-wing party whose programs are
deeply wrong, criticism of PiS’s policies should be placed upon that ground rather
than on the ground that its policies are “populist,” “anti-institutional,” or even “anti-
constitutional.”
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